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Unforgiven: Russian Intelligence Vengeance as Political 
Theater And Strategic Messaging 
 
DAVID V. GIOE, MICHAEL S. GOODMAN, AND DAVID S. FREY1 
 
ABSTRACT 
The March 2018 poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer and MI6 agent 
Sergei Skripal again highlights the enduring Russian ardor for poisoning perceived 
enemies of the state as a warning to others who contemplate disloyalty. Beyond treating the 
event itself, we explore Russian conceptions of theatrical murder as a peculiar element of 
state power. We historicize this development and inquire whether assassination as political 
theater and strategic messaging is a tool embraced in particular by Vladimir Putin or 
rather emblematic of the Russian state, to the extent that there is any discernable 
difference between the two in the context of an autocracy. Further, we explore why and 
how Putin opted to strike at the moment he did to seek vengeance against Skripal. We 
suggest that a confluence of structural and human factors at the intersection of British 
government policies with Russian domestic politics led Putin to his decision. We conclude 
with discussion of the implications of these findings for western governments.  
 
Introduction: A Spy becomes a Tsar 
In Francis Ford Coppola’s 1972 film adaption of Mario Puzo’s The Godfather, crime boss 
Michael Corleone anticipates an assassination plot by long-time trusted family insider Salvatore 
Tessio. Michael turns the tables first and Tessio realizes he has been revealed as the traitor. 
Understanding the gravity of his situation, Tessio plaintively asks family consigliore Tom 
Hagan, “Can you get me off the hook for old time’s sake?” Hagan shakes his head, “I can’t do it, 
Sal.” Both Hagan and Tessio know that there is only one punishment for an insider betraying an 
organization that one served loyally for decades—execution. If Michael Corleone were to 
                                                 
1 This analysis is theirs alone and does not represent the position of their employers or any government. 
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forgive Tessio’s double cross, or even give him a reprieve from his death sentence, members of 
the family crime syndicate may doubt Michael’s toughness and resolve, perhaps inviting others 
to contemplate betrayal as well. Michael retains his grip on power and achieves subordinate 
loyalty through a savvy combination of instilling fear and commanding respect. He may take no 
joy in Tessio’s execution, but he has no choice. Such is the foundation upon which all that the 
Corleone family has built rests.  
Like Corleone, Russian President Vladimir Putin presides over a mafia state in which 
power intermingles with corruption, kleptocracy, and extrajudicial murder, which is not limited 
to former intelligence turncoats, but also includes the assassination of investigative journalists 
and political rivals.1 For instance, one of Putin’s most outspoken opponents, liberal politician 
Boris Nemtsov, was murdered in February 2015 on a Moscow bridge visible from the Kremlin, 
shot six times in the back.2 It is true that Nemtsov was never a trusted insider in the same way a 
Russian intelligence officer would be, but Putin can tolerate no unpunished disloyalty, for one 
instance of leniency has the potential to unwind all that he has built—a crack that could 
inexorably lead to an earthquake. Given Putin’s professional background as an intelligence 
officer, betrayal of Russia by its intelligence officers is a particularly odious offence meriting not 
just death, but symbolic assassination and suggests one reason why Nemtsov might have been 
expeditiously dispatched with bullets, but Skripal, and Alexander Litvinenko before him, was 
made to theatrically suffer. In fact, these acts are characterized by gratuitous suffering and 
imbued with strong political messages and to former collaborators: wherever you reside, I can 
reach you.   
This Russian prioritization of theatrical revenge, even at the expense of large-scale 
diplomatic reprisals and biting economic sanctions, reveals both the nature of the regime and its 
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leader who is contemporaneously a product and a driver of the Russian state. The dearth of 
intelligence-driven scholarly literature regarding the enduring Russian ardor for theatrical 
vengeance as strategic messaging—and conducted by its intelligence organs—has serious 
implications for western intelligence and security services that need to improve capabilities for 
protecting defectors in perpetuity and for the British government to properly resource traditional 
counterintelligence and security efforts against state-based threats.3  
 
A “Wet Job” in view of the Magna Carta 
On 4 March 2018, former Russian military intelligence officer and British Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6) spy Sergei Skripal, long publicly derided as a 
“traitor” and “scumbag” by Vladimir Putin, and Skripal’s daughter Yulia, became victims of 
Putin’s vengeful long arm. Found unresponsive on a park bench in the sleepy English city of 
Salisbury, notably home of perhaps the best-preserved copy of the Magna Carta, the pair was 
poisoned with Novichok, a family of nerve agents known to be in the Russian inventory.4 British 
Prime Minister Theresa May said it was “highly likely” that Russia was the culprit.5 Then, just 
nine days later, Russian businessman Nikolai Glushkov died in an “unexplained” manner 
according to British police, who took nothing for granted because of Glushkov’s association with 
Putin critics. The following day, May retaliated by expelling 23 Russian diplomats and Western 
and Russian foreign ministries have escalated tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions to rarely before 
seen levels.6 
Since the attack more has become known about Skripal’s background and involvement 
with British intelligence. According to The Times journalist Ben Macintyre, he was allegedly 
recruited by Britain’s foreign intelligence organisation, the SIS, in 1995 following a tip-off on 
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his potential willingness to cooperate from Spanish intelligence. An SIS officer, acting as the 
partner to a Spanish businessman, successfully recruited him while he was stationed in Spain. 
The SIS gave Skripal the codenamed Forthwith and over a ten-year period he regularly provided 
a stream of reliable intelligence.  
As a member of Russian military intelligence, the GRU, Skripal had access to a wide 
variety of information, including the GRU’s telephone directory, the structure of the GRU as 
well as details on its staff, and the true identities of scores of Russian intelligence officers.7 SIS 
paid for his information; even after his retirement from the military he continued to provide the 
British with snippets of intelligence that he gleaned from former colleagues. His espionage 
activities were apparently discovered after a member of the Spanish security service passed his 
identity to the Russians. He was subsequently arrested and convicted of treason in 2004 but was 
exchanged in a high-profile spy swap in 2010, after which he relocated to the UK. He settled in 
the south of England and kept a relatively low profile, but was not in hiding, until his recent 
poisoning. According to SIS sources cited by Macintyre, he was “one of the most productive 
spies of the post-Cold War period,” suggesting that the information Skripal provided went far 
beyond internal telephone books and organization charts.8   
 
Putin as Standard-bearer, not Pioneer 
Although much hard evidence on some details is still lacking – and will likely remain so 
given the challenges of securing written records of Putin’s reign – we approach this exploration 
through an analysis of patterns of Russian behavior that predate Putin, but through which we can 
identify Putin as the standard bearer, if not the pioneer. Indeed, Moscow has a long history of 
murdering perceived enemies of the state in far off places. Russianists from Hélène Carrère 
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d’Encausse to Amy Knight have persuasively demonstrated how ingrained political assassination 
has been in Russian History.9  Those cooperating with the West, especially in the realm of 
intelligence, have been targeted for assassination in particular, and some historical context is 
necessary. Even before the US entered the Second World War, Soviet intelligence officers 
Ignace Reiss and Walter Krivitsky defected (denouncing Josef Stalin and backing Leon Trotsky). 
Both were tracked down and executed. Reiss was killed in 1937 in Switzerland only weeks after 
he penned a letter to Josef Stalin announcing his defection. The Soviets originally planned to 
poison Reiss with strychnine in a box of chocolates, but when that did not work he was executed 
in a manner reminiscent of Michael Corleone’s hot-headed older brother Sonny—lured to a 
roadside ambush, his body was riddled with bullets, including five in his head as a grisly 
exclamation point.10  
Leon Trotsky himself was famously murdered with an ice pick in Mexico in 1940, 
although the novelty of an ice pick has been over-interpreted. In this case the selection of an ice 
pick as a murder weapon probably had more to do with availability and concealment versus 
gruesome theater, but the underlying vengeance was as real as the corpse. Stalin’s agents did a 
slightly better job setting the stage in executing erstwhile intelligence officer Krivitsky, who was 
found dead in his hotel room in Washington, D.C., in February of 1941, in a scene that was 
supposed to look like a suicide, including three suicide notes just in case anyone were to doubt 
he had killed himself.11 
While political assassinations became less common during the decade after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, with the rise of Vladimir Putin they took on a new meaning and significance, 
indicating that theatrical murder, while consistent with historical precedent, must also be 
interpreted beyond the state. Western scholars and journalists have reported on leaked secret 
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Kremlin directives dating from the 1990s and 2000s authorizing the elimination of individuals 
deemed “enemies of the state” and residing outside Russia.12 In 2006 the Upper Chamber of the 
Russian Parliament (Federation Council) passed legislation allowing the President to unilaterally 
and without prior consultation approve the extra-judicial killing abroad of anyone deemed an 
“extremist.” In addition, the definition of an extremist was expanded to accommodate “those 
causing mass disturbances, committing hooliganism or acts of vandalism,” as well as anyone 
who undermined the Russian government.13 One of the first victims of Putin’s vengeance was 
the former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Alexander Litvinenko, whose death, 
according to the official British inquiry, was “probably” approved by Putin personally.14   
The British official inquiry did not have to look very hard to arrive at the conclusion that 
Putin was personally responsible for sanctioning revenge murder. He has not hidden his 
willingness to engage in “wet affairs” [mokroye delo]; indeed, that would be self-defeating, 
especially as interpreted for a domestic audience. Tonia Samsonova of Echo of Moscow Radio 
has speculated that he wants the deaths of those who betray him to be noticed, overt messages to 
always toe the line aimed squarely at other oligarchs or government officials, particularly of 
intelligence operatives, who dream of retirement in the West. 15  When asked about specific 
killings, Putin routinely evades such questions as deftly as a talented spy evades surveillance. 
But when speaking in general terms, Putin has been clear. Globalsecurity.org and numerous 
other sources quote the Russian leader has having made some variation of the Mafioso-like threat 
that translates to “traitors will kick the bucket, trust me” after the very same spy exchange in 
2010 that permitted Skripal to move to England.16 It is thus facile to assess that Putin would 
conflate permitting a spy exchange with forgiveness. This confusion nearly cost Sergei and Yulia 
Skripal their lives.  
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A Time to Betray, and a Time to Seek Revenge 
A broader view of international events and certain political considerations and policy 
factors in British government helps explain why the Kremlin chose to act in early 2018. First, 
since the turn of the Millennium the British Security Service (MI5) has had to pull resources 
away from traditional state-based counterintelligence threats (such as Russia) to focus on radical 
Islamists. 2017 saw deadly attacks at the Manchester Arena, Westminster Bridge, and Borough 
Market in London. Moreover, while those attacks were “successful,” MI5 claims to have 
thwarted nine attacks during the same time frame. This offers a glimpse as to the magnitude of 
the threat, reinforced by the fact that MI5 spends 82 percent of its efforts on counter-terrorism 
(equating to 64 percent of its overall budget), according to the public report of the British 
Intelligence and Security Committee.17 The report further noted that MI5 was spending a mere 
18 percent of its overall budget on “hostile state activity,” a category which includes counter-
espionage, counter-proliferation, and protective security.  
Even with this lopsided resource distribution, after the 2017 attacks by radical Islamists it 
became known that while MI5 was aware of the perpetrators, hard choices about resource 
allocation meant that the agency could not support continuous physical surveillance of the 
terrorists.18  Russian intelligence likely extrapolated from the public airing of MI5’s budget 
limitations that its agents had greater freedom of action (and freedom from surveillance) than in 
previous years. This would have permitted Russian intelligence to start the careful process of 
planning for Skripal’s exotic demise, beginning with identifying his daily routines, with some 
level of comfort that British physical surveillance would not be extensive and was unlikely to 
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prevent the operation – although it could be largely recreated after the fact using Britain’s 
ubiquitous CCTV cameras.  
Second, Putin, like most other international observers, may have calculated that the 
Brexit negotiations over Britain’s exit from the European Union were not advancing in Britain’s 
favor. Putin may have interpreted this British economic vulnerability to mean that the penalty for 
murdering critics in the UK likely would be minimal. Any British financial response would 
require support from London’s banking center, which, in the (potential) throes of international 
banks and corporations moving away from London due to Brexit, would be loath to sanction 
sanctions. Illustrative of this hesitancy to turn away Russian money, even in better pre-Brexit 
financial times, was made clear in 2014. Then British Deputy National Security Advisor Hugh 
Powell was openly carrying official papers outside 10 Downing Street that were photographed 
by the media. Powell’s uncovered document stated Britain will “not support, for now, trade 
sanctions…or close London's financial centre to Russians.”19 Putin may understandably have 
reasoned that if invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea -- part of a sovereign European country – 
a  would not invite any significant military, diplomatic, or economic response from Whitehall, 
surely a dead spy or two would not merit substantial retaliation. After all, in the aftermath of the 
assassination of Litvinenko in 2006, Prime Minister David Cameron’s muted response was to 
expel a few Russian diplomats.  
Given the July 2018 indictments of Russians by the Mueller investigation in the United 
States, which may have been obtained through use of information supplied by spies within the 
Russian government, the attempt to murder Skripal could have been meant a pre-emptive 
warning to future turncoats: do not dare.20 Messages “written” on the bodies of perceived traitors 
to mother Russia have been delivered in the US before. In late 2015, former Putin advisor 
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Mikhail Lesin died of “blunt force injuries” in a Washington, D.C. hotel, according to the 
medical report, which noted trauma to his “neck, torso, upper extremities and lower extremities.” 
Surely there is no reason to bruise a victim’s extremities, especially the legs, during a murder, 
but whoever gave the order to assassinate Lesin must have hoped that such a painful experience 
would send the right message to anyone who may dare to cross Putin, or the state – to the extent 
two can be usefully separated.21   
Domestically, Putin could have been adjusting the complex balance of oligarchs and 
siloviki, Russian military and security officials, communicating to his more hard-line supporters 
that he will brook no dissent and still has his hand firmly on the levers of power. Indeed, as 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin would recall, Soviet and Russian leaders since Stalin have 
risked much when weakness is perceived domestically, especially by the military and 
intelligence apparatus. On the other hand, Russian assassinations have taken various forms that 
are intended for broad public consumption as gruesome political theater. They are sadly too 
numerous to recount here, but two are representative: While Russian journalist and human rights 
advocate Anna Politkovskaya was shot in an apparent contract killing on 7 October 2006 –also 
Vladimir Putin’s birthday—in her Moscow apartment building, Ivan Safronov, a Russian 
journalist critical of Russia’s military died after falling from a 5th floor window in Moscow the 
following year. These mysterious and terrible deaths may simply be a reminder to the general 
public about the reach of the state. The attempted assassination of Skripal, just prior to Russia’s 
hosting of the World Cup, may have been a reminder to residents of Russia to behave while 
Putin enjoyed the world stage. 
 
Putin Chooses his Weapon 
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Perceived enemies of the Russian state, like the Soviet Union before it, have met their 
ends in many ways.22 While being pushed out of windows, hanged, or bludgeoned are terrifying 
ways to die, the Russian fascination with assassination by poison endures. Poison is appealing 
for a few reasons. First, it is quiet and can be done in the open. It would be suitable for a sleepy 
city in Salisbury, as in the case of Skripal, or London hotel tea, as in the case of Litvinenko. It 
can give the assassin time to depart the scene before his deed becomes known. In this sense, 
poison is preferred for both tactical and strategic reasons because it is tactically suitable for 
discreet murder yet laced with strategic messaging. Tactically, poison can be administered in 
plain sight and the victim does not have to be present at the same time and place, thus favouring 
the attacker’s escape arrangements by permitting the assassin to depart the area in advance of 
any symptoms shown by the victim. It also enhances flexibility when selecting the right time. 
One cannot pull a gun and shoot someone over tea in a London hotel unnoticed, but Polonium-
210 in a cup of tea would be suitable. Likewise, one cannot expect a clean getaway after 
shooting a pedestrian on Waterloo Bridge, but a ricin-tipped umbrella would suffice. Finally, 
shots ringing out or a home break-in would raise eyebrows in sleepy Salisbury, but a silent 
poison would accomplish the task.  
Second, the victim suffers, often publicly, yielding poison’s grim strategic effect. The 
photographs of Alexander Litvinenko, hairless, gaunt, suffering in his hospital bed grimly 
underscores the intended message for anyone who might consider following in their footsteps 
and cooperating with a Western intelligence service. This may be one reason why no 
photographs of Skripal lying in hospital or any specifics as to his condition have emerged, as 
graphic evidence of Novichok’s gruesome effects would amplify the strategic message of the 
poisoning—something British authorities would seek to avoid. 
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Finally, any thug can murder with a gun or blunt force the head. Soviet and subsequently 
Russian leaders have taken assassination to a dramatic art form, wishing to separate themselves 
from thieves, loan sharks, and the underground. The use of military grade exotic poisons shows 
that assassinations are not mano-a-mano, but rather brings the full power of the state to bear 
against an individual, framing the situation as hopeless and futile. In 2013 exiled Russian 
oligarch and Putin enemy Boris Berezovsky was found hanged in his London home. Berezovsky 
used to observe with prophetic gallows humor that his security guard “was not a bodyguard; he’s 
a witness.”23  Poison does not always kill but arguably this does not matter if the effect is 
demonstrable or disabling. For example, consider the enduring disfigurement as happened to 
former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who defeated the Kremlin’s man in the 2004 
Presidential race. Although Yushchenko survived and made a physical recovery, his face is 
forever scarred from military grade dioxin poisoning, a permanent reminder of the penalty when 
challenging not just an autocrat, but also a state. 
With respect to the most recent assassination attempt on British soil, former Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson stated, the “use of this nerve agent would represent the first use of nerve 
agents on the continent of Europe since the Second World War.”24 That is true as far as it goes, 
but the focus on the precise type and category of poison employed obscures the more 
problematic issue of defectors and dissidents—many of whom having provided significant 
service to Her Majesty’s Government—being killed in Britain with exotic and theatrical means. 
Further, language such as “first use,” while technically accurate, de-historicizes the problem of 
dead Russians in Britain by focusing on the type of lethal agent and would therefore neglect not 
only the Litvinenko assassination but also the 1978 murder of Bulgarian dissident Georgi 
Markov on Waterloo Bridge with ricin.25 Although Polonium-210 is a radioactive element and 
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ricin is a toxin and therefore not a nerve agent in the family of Novichok, focusing on the 
specific poison obscures the pressing historical precedent given the various exotic ways in which 
Russians have been poisoned in Britain since Markov’s murder.  
Although the murders of Markov, Litvinenko, and the attempt on Skripal set a pattern, 
Russian poison innovation and development have proceeded apace, each attempt more 
complicated and scientifically demanding than the last. Indeed, Novichok is different, not only 
scientifically but also symbolically. It is a family of agents rather than a specific variant, though 
it is often used as a catchall term for them. Developed in the waning days of the Cold War and 
even then, within the offensive FOLIANT nerve agent program conducted by the Soviet 
government, it was held to be in a class of its own. As a binary chemical weapon its separate 
elements are not, in themselves, dangerous. Yet once its harmless precursors are mixed it 
becomes, according to its creators, one of the most potent nerve agents ever created.26 The 
consensus view of experts is that it can only be created by a state given the facilities, resources, 
and expertise required to provide it.  
 Novichok’s characteristics are fairly well known in the West as one its main creators, Vil 
Mirzayanov, fled to the US in the early 1990s while Boris Yeltsin was President of Russia.27 
Novichok exists in solid form, as a thick paste, in powder form, as well as in gas and liquid 
forms. Indeed, recent reporting indicates that the assassin may have employed a liquid form of 
the agent because a resident of nearby Amesbury died of exposure to it after believing it was a 
perfume. Apparently, her boyfriend had found what looked to be an expensive bottle of fragrance 
simply discarded.28 Although antidotes exist, as Mirzayanov confided, while they might prevent 
anyone exposed from dying, they would likely be “an invalid for the rest of their life.”29 
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In practical terms, exposure would be “almost instantaneous.” Once the chemicals 
entered the bloodstream, Skripal would have had muscle spasms, his pupils would have shrunk, 
and he would have had difficulty breathing. In fact, there is one documented case of a previous 
attack using Novichok, which reveals something of its utter ruthlessness. In 1995, Russian 
businessman Ivan Kivilidi and his secretary both died. The assassin had coated Kivilidi’s 
telephone with Novichok and, following his exposure, the banker fell into a coma and died from 
kidney failure. His secretary took ill from simply dusting his office; she had not touched the 
telephone. The perpetrator also became sick but managed to disclose that he had purchased the 
Novichok from a member of the Russian State Scientific Research Institute of Organic 
Chemistry and Technology.30 
From released information by the British government and via media sources there are 
several elements to assigning responsibility as to who the perpetrator was behind the attack. The 
most obvious is that it can only have been created by a state, and there is ample evidence that the 
Russians have previously stockpiled it. But to complement the physical and chemical evidence 
from the attack itself is additional intelligence, quite separate to what happened. British 
intelligence briefings provided to allied countries have included some information on the remote 
Russian factory behind the manufacture of Novichok. At the plant it has been reported that 
stockpiles are “far smaller that would be used as a battlefield weapon,” thereby “suggesting their 
use in targeted killings.”31 One former member of Russian intelligence suggested that it is “too 
dirty” to be used casually and so the only implication is that it was designed to garner attention 
and remind would-be defectors of the terrifying arsenal that could be brought against them.32 
The characteristics of the poison and the optics of its use help the Russians thread the 
needle of evidentiary and legal culpability versus messaging. On the one hand, Novichok is like 
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a signature, a silver bullet with an engraving making it abundantly clear that the source is Russia.  
On the other hand, it allows for plausible deniability by the Kremlin, which can feign offense at 
the accusations and mendaciously demand scientific evidence.33 This stance allows the Kremlin 
to send messages of obvious responsibility and impunity to its domestic audience and those it 
views as traitors. The ease of “getting away with it” allows Putin to project strength, disdain for 
Western democracy and traditions of justice, and an unlimited sense of Russian power at the 
strategic level. At the same time, the Kremlin claims to be playing by the West’s respect for 
evidence and rule of law, it is thumbing its nose at those traditions. In the case of Salisbury, 
Russia disingenuously offered to “assist” with the investigation, while at the same time 
dispatching agents and launching cyberattacks to tamper with the Swiss Speiz laboratory testing 
Novichok and other chemical weapons samples.  
Recalling the case of Litvinenko, once British authorities discovered his assassin, ex-
KGB officer Andrei Lugovoy, they called for his extradition from Russia for trial. Obviously, 
there was no expectation that Putin would comply, but with theatrical flair Putin instead awarded 
him a medal for “services to the motherland.”34 At the tactical level, the idea of “getting away 
with it” holds only until the Russian operatives are back on Russian soil, from whence they 
would never be extradited. There were traces of Polonium-210 at various points in London, 
permitting the subsequent inquest into Litvinenko’s death to make a reasonable claim of 
Lugovoy’s responsibility, but the chance that Putin would ever give up a loyal fellow KGB 
veteran to the West is impossible. For Putin, it does seem loyalty is a two-way street. 35  
Much like the Russians meddling into the 2016 American presidential election, a little 
obfuscation goes a long way. As in the election, Kremlin spokesmen and diplomats have denied 
the allegations in the Salisbury case, no matter how credible the evidence. They also asked for 
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more proof from their accusers and even lob counter-assertions that the nerve agent was of 
British origin.36 Had the assassins been caught red-handed and sentenced to prison in Britain, 
that might have been a public relations defeat for Putin, but once his henchmen are back in 
Russia, he can taunt his victims, as his press secretaries ask the Russian equivalent of “who could 
be guilty of such an exquisite and well-planned crime?” Still, the Russian operatives only 
escaped punishment in a manner of speaking. Instead of occupying a British holding cell 
awaiting trial, they are safe in Russia, but it is likely that they will never travel beyond Russia’s 
sphere of influence again. Indeed, fellow Kremlin assassin Lugovoy has not left Russia since his 
role in Litvinenko’s death in 2006 for fear of an international arrest warrant.  
Technology married with dogged gumshoes—both official and of the fourth estate—
following the trail cracked open the case. Ubiquitous British CCTV and video surveillance 
cameras caught the pair of assassins at various stops on their morbid journey starting with their 
arrival at London’s Gatwick airport, to their east London hotel, and then picking them up again 
at the train station and on public streets in Salisbury. After months of detective work and 
thousands of hours of pouring over CCTV footage, British authorities identified the perpetrators 
as Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov. Petrov was subsequently identified by the 
investigative website Bellingcat as Dr. Alexander Mishkin, a GRU physician, and Boshirov was 
revealed to be Anatoliy Chepiga, a highly decorated GRU colonel.37 The public identification of 
assailants took a farcical turn when (before their real names emerged) they agreed to a television 
interview with Russia’s state-funded RT (formerly known as Russia Today) under the aliases 
that they used to travel to Salisbury. The interview was plausibly described by British authorities 
as “risible” and indeed the comical cover story (and selling of that cover story) would not have 
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passed muster for a Boy Scout’s merit badge in covert travel.38 While this particular farce surely 
backfired, other Russian efforts in the information environment have hit closer to their marks. 
 
The Cyber and Information Warfare Dimension 
 In the early weeks after Skripal’s poisoning, it became obvious that Russia was behind 
the attack. In response, Russian internet trolls took to social media with a now familiar aim: to 
sow doubt and confusion as well as make people question what they clearly saw. The trolls 
latched onto an online Twitter poll established by a vocal British critic of Prime Minister May. 
The poll asked users whether May “has supplied enough evidence for us to be able to confidently 
point the finger of blame towards Russia?” An overwhelming majority voted “no”, but 
subsequent analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) 
concluded that pro-Kremlin bots were responsible for most of the influential retweets, funneled 
through other international platforms on both the left and right, such the Facebook account of 
Italian nationalist Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini and the Ron Paul Institute on the right, 
and the German party Die Linke on the left.39 A senior DFRLab associate explained, this was “an 
attempt by pro-Russian users to influence the online poll, and thus to create the appearance of 
greater hostility towards the UK government than UK users themselves showed.”40 This attack 
and a larger disinformation campaign, an exposé in the Washington Post concluded, was likely 
organized by or associated with the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) in St. Petersburg, 
the same troll farm indicted by Robert Mueller’s prosecutorial team.41 Although the initial poll 
seemed authentic, the IRA successfully capitalized on an organic critique to manipulate the 
results and mislead or misrepresent the British public’s view as a result. 
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The Russian full court press went far beyond Twitter polls. It involved television, 
Facebook, YouTube, and even traditional media, and demonstrated the Kremlin’s reliance on its 
information warriors to pull its former little green men out of the fire. The campaign, in which 
Russian outlets disseminated at least 46 false stories and conspiracy theories, successfully 
overwhelmed fact-based reporting by mainstream outlets.42  Not only was there a deluge of 
disinformation, but social media engagement statistics demonstrated that the falsehoods attracted 
additional users and gained ground from the Kremlin perspective. In terms of digital volume, by 
early April 2018, nearly 90 percent of Facebook posts with the term “Skripal” either originated 
from Russian state-owned accounts or were associated with a pro-Kremlin narrative. And these 
posts were shared with vigor. According to Donara Barojan of the DFRLab, “a review of the 
most-shared articles on social media suggested that content from Kremlin-owned and pro-
Kremlin media outlets far outranked mainstream and independent media on audience 
engagement statistics.”43  
Between the 2016 American presidential election, the British Brexit vote, and the Skripal 
poisoning (just to name a few), Russia’s 4D strategy of distract, dismiss, distort, dismay has been 
impressively successful. The trolls at the IRA, the producers at RT, and Russian politicians 
themselves, among others, have amply proven that they can create appealing content for those 
who are of a mind to believe it, and to sow seeds of doubt even among critical information 
consumers. The head of RT, Margarita Simoyan, has gone as far as publicly stating that “there is 
no such thing as objective reporting,” while Russian politicians and diplomats have brazenly 
recirculated false stories they themselves concocted.44 This traction and broad diffusion that 
these campaigns of confusion have been able to achieve in otherwise advanced and educated 
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societies is both a credit to the Russians’ mastery of the craft of information warfare, or at least 
the narratives about it, as well as alarming for the future of western civic engagement. 
 Yet, Russia’s cyber and information warriors were not only in reaction mode after the 
assassin’s sloppy tradecraft ultimately led to their unmasking. In fact, British authorities claim 
that the GRU’s cyber specialists hacked several email accounts associated with Yulia Skripal as 
a means of keeping tabs on their ultimate target.45 The implication is that Russian intelligence is 
not only using disinformation to cover their tracks, but hacking and cyber operations were part of 
the planning process from the time that Russian leaders selected the elder Skripal for 
assassination.  
 
Putin’s Domestic Political Signalling 
The Russian message, and signals of its vast cyber operation, are omnipresent, and 
purposely so. It has been alleged that there are many former Russian SIS agents, “at least a dozen 
more,” living in the UK.46 The threats against them are neither veiled nor surprising to those 
agents.47 If people like Skripal, whom evidence suggests was aware his life was in jeopardy and 
had contacted police to express his fears, had any doubts, Russian state TV Channel One was 
happy to allay them.48 Channel One in Russia warned:  
Don’t choose England as a place to live. Whatever the reasons, whether you’re a 
professional traitor to the motherland or you just hate your country in your spare 
time, I repeat, no matter, don’t move to England...Something is not right there. 
Maybe it’s the climate. But in recent years there have been too many strange 
incidents with a grave outcome. People get hanged, poisoned, they die in 
helicopter crashes and fall out of windows in industrial quantities.49 
 
Hardly subtle. In fact, leaving this sort of “calling card,” like Novichok itself ensures that the 
message is received beyond the victim. 
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The Russian message to intelligence defectors, critical journalists, and rival oligarchs is 
crystal clear: Choose your team carefully, and ask yourself, can it protect you in 
perpetuity? Torture and torturous death communicates that Russian power is ubiquitous and that 
there is no statute of limitations on betrayal. Because one is traded to the West in a spy swap, as 
in the case of Skripal, does not mean the betrayal is forgiven or forgotten, or that the traitor is 
safe. In 2010 Putin wanted his deep cover “illegal” intelligence operatives back from the US, 
where they had been arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and made the deal with 
American and British authorities.50 That was an act of pragmatic calculation, not forgiveness. 
There is no “water under the bridge” in this worldview, and bygones are certainly not that. For 
Putin, whether Skripal resided on the Avon or the Moskva was immaterial. The time was right to 
carry out his sentence, as the motto of Stalin’s wartime military counterintelligence directorate 
SMERSH commanded: “Death to Spies!” 
 
Putin’s International Signalling 
Beyond overtly signalling would-be traitors and Russia’s domestic audience, the 
Kremlin’s poisoning of Skripal’s communicates three critical messages to the West as well. First, 
assassinations are, for Putin as they have been for dictators from Mussolini to Stalin to the Shah 
to Kim Jong-Un, a necessary and legitimate performance in the theater of power. Although the 
bare-shirt horseback riding, Judo-practising, animal-wrestling Putin may have little more to offer 
Russia than the image of strength, he has capitalized on it. His recent political campaign posters 
offered the following equation: “Strong President—Strong Russia.” The impunity the Kremlin’s 
killers seem to enjoy further bolsters Putin’s image as a man whose power is inevitable and 
unstoppable, a global force. Martial strength has brought some measure of domestic support and 
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grudging international recognition. This makes assassinations worth the diplomatic and/or 
economic costs, provided they remain at historically perfunctory tit-for-tat levels. Indeed, the 
coordinated response to the attempted murder of Skripal may change this calculation, although it 
seems unlikely, even after the coordinated expulsion of some 150 Russian diplomats and spies 
worldwide. Still, Putin’s willingness to transcend the rules while claiming he does nothing of the 
sort, whether in Salisbury or Syria, provides him with more diplomatic heft than he feels he 
would lose should the West further sanction Russia. He fully understands that his power rests on 
intimidating rivals, dissidents, and critics, and true intimidation requires demonstrating that he 
can execute his opponents whenever he wishes. Showing restraint would be a sign of weakness, 
the fateful first crack in the edifice of his authoritarian regime.   
Second, assassinations further efface the division between leader and state and 
complement Putin’s leader/state conflation effectively. Betrayal of one is betrayal of the other. 
Here again Putin draws from the well-worn playbook of autocrats and dictators, for whom 
appropriation of Louis XIV’s famous statement “I am the State”, rather than “I am the leader of a 
state”, is de rigeur. Any threat against Putin thus becomes an existential one for Russia, and 
existential threats must be destroyed by any means necessary.    
The logic becomes circular. If the threats were not significant, they would not require 
people to die. But since enemies keep dying, they must represent a grave threat to Russia. The 
equation of leader and state also helps explain the nature of Russian denials to the West. These 
denials may insist that there is no proof that Russians carried out assassinations or interfered in 
elections, but there is never denial of Western conclusions that if those actions were carried out, 
they had to be done so with orders from Putin. Putin thus benefits from Western reports that 
nothing happens in Russia without his permission or knowledge. Fake news or not, reports that 
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Skripal or others wrote to Putin to ask forgiveness likewise are central to the narrative of Putin’s 
power.51 These accounts cement perceptions, both domestically and globally, of his domination 
of the state, his absolute power, and even his ability to determine what constitutes the truth. This 
correlation of “Putin as Russia” establishes strict limits. Deviation is thus easy to spot and 
betrayal far worse than simply turning on an individual or institution.   
Third, the West must appreciate that Putin’s identity will always be that of a professional 
intelligence officer. Those intelligence officials that betray the GRU, like Skripal, or the FSB, 
like Litvinenko, have done more than offend the state; they have betrayed Putin’s understanding 
of the sacred loyalty owed by an intelligence officer to the state. Intelligence professionals are 
entrusted with the state’s deepest secrets and betrayal of that trust requires revenge, no matter the 
time or distance removed. Further, Putin’s training as a Soviet-era intelligence officer imparted a 
worldview not just of communism, but of loathing for and competition with the West. The goal 
of Soviet intelligence–destruction of the Western democratic order—remains prominent in 
Putin’s mind. 52  Brutal assassinations are a particularly terrifying way to demonstrate the 
weakness of the West to Westerners, and its unsuitability for Russia. 
 
Conclusion: Calibrating a Western Response 
This article has explored some key factors and reasons why Putin uses his intelligence 
services to undertake theatrical political violence—notably poisons–under what conditions, the 
timing of their use, and the strategic messaging to both domestic and global audiences as a result. 
We have argued that poisons are both revenge and a signature warning, especially for those who 
have occupied and then betrayed a position of confidence in Russia’s intelligence and security 
apparatus. We have further noted the adroit incorporation of information warfare and cyber 
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dimensions for both offensive operations (locating Skripal) as well as defensive operations to 
twist the public narrative to distract audiences, distort the truth, and sow discord and suspicion in 
Western public and government discourse. 
However, to calculate any meaningful response Western governments must first 
understand what Putin’s actions and methods are not. They are not a litmus test for the 
international community, nor are they a barometer to measure the potential Western 
repercussions for further military adventures in the Russian near abroad. They alone do not 
signal either a hardening of Russian support for allies such as Bashar al-Assad. Neither are 
political assassinations a proxy for other geostrategic moves the Kremlin might wish to make. 
They should be taken on their own terms, and taken seriously, but without over-interpretation 
that would lead to policy confusion.  
To counter the Kremlin, the West must demonstrate both strength and resolve, but it must 
also understand that political murder, like intelligence collection, cyber operations, and 
information warfare, are levers of Russian state power and unlikely to be abandoned whatever 
the price. Still, costs can be imposed to signal moral outrage and force Putin to use this tactic 
more sparingly. The coordinated diplomatic expulsions of scores of Russians across the globe, 
many of whom were likely to be intelligence officers, has a short-term and useful effect on the 
ability of the FSB to operate abroad, but its impact will only be limited.  
Additionally, the West must show that it can protect the Russian intelligence officers who 
have boldly confronted the Russian security apparatus and left Russia alive. Occasional 
diplomatic expulsions or economic sanctions will not deter Putin from targeting defectors, who 
can be better protected once resettled in the West. This is a resource question and MI5 should 
devote greater resources to protect those that SIS has brought in from the cold.  
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Beyond specific responses to assassination, in general the West must act decisively and 
defend its principles. This would include, as Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee has already 
concluded, moral leadership from Westminster to the London business community to forgo 
Russian investment and travel permissions, making it harder for Putin’s oligarch power base to 
convert ill-gotten rubles into dollars, euros, and pounds sterling, to spend grandiose sums at 
Harrods, or to cruise the streets of London in exotic Italian sports cars.53 Finally, the British 
government could identify other Russian media and messaging outlets as information operations 
efforts and shut down some of Putin’s powerful disinformation and propaganda tools. This 
would of course necessitate further engagement in an already testy relationship between the 
Home Office and Silicon Valley, but Putin’s trolls are clearly one of his most effective weapons, 
turning social media platforms into metaphorical battlefields where citizens of the West hack 
each other to pieces at the IRA’s and RT’s urging. 
If the responses are minor and piecemeal, from Putin’s perspective, it would be better for 
the Russian Embassy in London to close down and for Moscow to forfeit diplomatic relations 
with the UK than for one traitor on British soil to escape “judgment.” However, if the EU, US, 
and other like-minded allies act in concert and enact long-term punishments, such as described in 
this section, as signs are indicating they might, then perhaps Putin might be persuaded. Even 
that, however, seems improbable, but he could be checked to a greater degree. Lack of 
diplomatic dialogue is not an existential threat to Putin’s power. However, betrayal from deep 
inside a kleptocratic security state, just like betrayal of the Corleone family, is. Forcing Putin to 
reconsider his methods, international priorities, and depriving him of powerful information 
warfare tools would, like New York’s five mafia families agreed in The Godfather, help keep the 
peace.  
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